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In this study, we evaluate the impact of R&D intensity on acquiring firms’ 
abnormal returns by examining 925 Canadian completed deals between 1993 and 2002 
that have information on R&D expenditures. While examining the returns to acquiring 
firm shareholders in the R&D intensive firms we evaluate two competing hypotheses: 
‘growth potential hypothesis’ and ‘integration failure hypothesis’. According to the 
‘growth potential hypothesis’, in light of the growth potential of the targets acquired by 
R&D intensive firms, investors are likely to react positively. ‘Integration failure 
hypothesis’ focuses on integration difficulties of a target by an R&D intensive firms and 
suggests that investor might be skeptical of such acquisitions and react negatively. Our 
results show that R&D intensity (i.e. R&D expenditure by sales) has a positive and 
significant effect on cumulative abnormal returns of the acquiring firms around the 
announcement dates. This implies that market generally favors the M&A deals by R&D 
intensive firms. An analysis of the differentiating characteristics reveal that R&D firms 
have a significantly higher growth potential and undertake more stock financed deals 
compared to the non R&D firms. Further, our results show that there is no significant 
change in long-term operating performance subsequent to the M&A deals for both R&D 
firms and non R&D firms. In general, our results show support for ‘growth potential 
hypothesis’. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
R&D intensive firms make significant contributions to the economic growth of a country. 
Majority of the R&D intensive firms are from High-Tech industries (such as 
telecommunications, pharmaceuticals, and computer hardware) and are characterized by 
high growth potential (Kohers and Kohers, 2000) and operate in a relative risky business 
environment. These firms have a high pressure to innovate and grow its knowledge base 
to stay competitive in the market place. R&D intensive firms can stay innovative or grow 
its knowledge base either by undertaking a series of in-house projects over time or by 
acquiring external knowledge bases (Ahuja and Katila, 2001). However, due to 
competitive pressure and time-lag in developing in-house innovative capabilities, R&D 
intensive firms often resort to mergers and acquisitions (M&A hereafter) activities to 
realize growth potential. This study focuses on the M&A activities of R&D intensive 
firms with a Canadian M&A sample. 
 
 Prior studies in this area find that, in general, investors react favorably to the 
M&A announcements by high-tech acquiring firms (Kohers and Kohers, 2000). 
However, there are some important issues that are not adequately addressed in the extant 
literature. First, most of the prior studies with high-tech acquisitions are based on U.S. 
data. As Doukas and Petmezas (2007) point out, results of earlier M&A studies could be 
limited to a particular market. For example, most of the earlier studies with U.S. data 
have reported negative or insignificant reactions to M&A deals for the acquiring firms 
(Bruner, 2002); whereas, most of the Canadian studies have reported significantly 
positive reactions to M&A deals for the acquiring firms’ (Dutta and Jog, 2009). 
Therefore, results of earlier U.S. studies my not be extended to other M&A markets. 
Second, earlier studies primarily focus on acquisitions in high-tech sectors and assume 
that all firms in the high-tech sectors engage in extensive R&D activities and foster 
innovations. However, it is likely that all firms in the high-tech firm do not have similar 
focus on R&D activities and innovations. Similarly, some firms in the so-called low-tech 
sectors (such as food industry, mining industry) may pursue high level R&D activities. 
Therefore, it is more reasonable to focus on a firm’s R&D intensity (R&D expenditure by 
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sales) across all industry sectors instead of just focusing on high-tech sectors. Third, 
although prior studies examine the market reactions to M&A deals in high-tech sectors, 
not much attention has been paid to find explanation as to why market reacts in that 
particular way. In order to have a deeper insight into this issue, according to our view, we 
need to examine the differentiating characteristics of R&D intensive firms. Lastly, one of 
the main challenges in high-tech acquisitions is to integrate the target firm and its key 
people (Chaudhuri and Tarbizi 1999). Poor integration may cause failure of the 
acquisitions. In order to examine this integration issue in the acquisitions by R&D 
intensive firms, we need to examine the long-term operating performance of the 
acquiring firm subsequent to an acquisition. To the best of our knowledge, prior studies 
have not examined this issue. This study aims at filling these gaps. 
 
 In this study, we focus on 925 completed deals by Canadian acquirers between 
1993 and 2002 that have information on R&D expenditures. While examining the returns 
to acquiring firm shareholders in the R&D intensive firms we evaluate two competing 
hypotheses: ‘growth potential hypothesis’ and ‘integration failure hypothesis’. According 
to the ‘growth potential hypothesis’, considering the growth potential of the targets 
acquired by R&D intensive firms, investors are likely to react positively. ‘Integration 
failure hypothesis’ focuses on integration difficulties of a target firm by an R&D 
intensive acquiring firm and suggests that investor might be skeptical of such acquisitions 
and react negatively. Our results show that R&D intensity (i.e. R&D expenditure by 
sales) has a positive and significant effect on cumulative abnormal returns of the 
acquiring firms around the announcement dates. This implies that market generally favors 
the M&A deals by the R&D intensive firms. An analysis of the differentiating 
characteristics reveal that R&D firms have a significantly higher growth potential and 
undertake more stock financed deals compared to the non R&D firms. Further, our results 
show that there is no significant change in long-term operating performance subsequent 
to the acquisitions for both R&D firms and non R&D firms. In general, our results show 
support for ‘growth potential hypothesis’.  
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 Our study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we examine 
Canadian acquiring firms and thus present out-of-sample evidence with a different 
developed country capital market. We take the view that differences in the size of the 
economy and in the capital market and regulatory environment may lead to different 
results. Most of the prior studies focus on U.S. acquisition markets, where most of the 
M&A deals take place. However, Canadian M&A market is also considerably large and 
vibrant. As reported by Crosbie & Co., a Toronto-based merchant bank, total transaction 
values of the announced deals during 2007 was $370 billion with 1,941 deals in Canadian 
M&A market. This was a record in Canadian M&A history with 60 transactions in excess 
of $1 billion. Dutta and Jog (2009) identify a number of important differences between 
the Canadian and the U.S. M&A markets and show that market reactions to M&A 
announcements differ between these two markets.1 Second, we present some plausible 
explanations for the observed market reactions to the M&A deals undertaken by R&D 
intensive firms. We find that R&D firms are growth firms and they use stock deals more 
frequently compared to the non R&D firms. Third, we examine the long-term operating 
performance of the acquiring firms to evaluate the integration challenges in the 
acquisitions by R&D intensive firms. Finally, in the spirit of Kohers and Kohers (2001) 
we have also examined the long-term stock return performance of acquiring firms to 
understand the extent of overvaluation of the M&A deals. However, unlike Kohers and 
Kohers (2001) we do not find any significant long-term stock return underperformance 
for the R&D intensive firms. This finding reiterates the views of Doukas and Petmezas 
(2007) that outcome of M&A studies could be dependent on a particular market data. 
 
 The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the 
background and relevant literature review. Section 3 discusses the sample and 
methodology. Section 4 presents and discusses the empirical results. Section 6 presents 
the results of robustness checks. Section 6 presents summary and conclusions. 
 
1 M&A studies using U.S. data generally report either negative or insignificant abnormal returns for the 
acquiring firms around the announcement date (Bruner, 2002). This is contrary to the notion of the synergy 
motive that leads to acquisition activities. In contrast, previous Canadian studies consistently report 
significantly positive abnormal returns around the announcement date (Eckbo and Thorburn, 2000; Yuce 
and Ng, 2005).  
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2. BACKGROUND AND RELATED LITERATURE 
 
2.1 Acquisitions by R&D intensive firms 
 
R&D intensive firms face unique challenges as they operate in an uncertain and high-risk 
business environment. These firms need to deal with both new product development 
challenges and shorter product life cycles. As Chaudhuri and Tarbizi (1999) suggest, for 
the R&D intensive or High-Tech firms “a successful new product may boost market 
share and profits, but the relentless pace of innovation means that any one gain is likely 
to be brief” (p. 124). In order to satisfy the changing market needs, these firms need to 
develop long-term and sustainable capabilities and often need to make acquisitions to 
expand and sustain their technological and new product development capabilities.  
 
 Chaudhuri and Tarbizi (1999) examine the practices of 24 high-tech companies in 
their execution of 53 acquisitions in order to understand the key success factors in high-
tech acquisitions. They identify three critical steps in making a successful high tech 
acquisition: (i) assessing the needs prior to make an high-tech acquisition, (ii) identify 
potential targets and conduct extensive due diligence, and (iii) retain and integrate the 
new people. Most of the successful acquisitions that Chaudhuri and Tarbizi (1999) have 
studied have undertaken all these steps carefully. For example, prior to Cisco’s decision 
to acquire Crescendo - a privately held switch developer, the networking staff at Cisco 
had acknowledged the need to move into new switching technology due to the 
monitoring of rival competition and reacting to the resultant competitive pressures. The 
acquisition cost $95 million, and the integration went smoothly as the engineering staff 
were allowed to remain in the same team environment that they were originally in before 
the acquisition and the former founder (Mario Mazzola) of Crescendo was appointed 
head of all enterprise products at Cisco—the dominant business unit of the firm. Another 
example of a successful merger includes Advanced Micro Devices (AMD), who carefully 
considered NextGen before acquiring it in 1996. (Chaudhuri and Tabrizi, 1999). 
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 However, not all high-tech acquisitions are well-planned and well-coordinated. 
Many of the high-tech acquisitions are done hastily to achieve some short-term goals. In 
the high-tech industry that is characterized by fast-changing technology and markets, 
acquisitions aimed at a specific product or market share do not contribute to long-term 
success (Chaudhuri and Tabrizi, 1999). Further, the managers of R&D intensive firms are 
likely to be infected with ‘hubris’ (Roll, 1986) and may make judgmental errors in 
making acquisitions. As a result, many high-tech acquisitions have failed in the past. In 
Canada, Nortel was a tech giant in 1990s and its shareholders had experienced some 
unprecedented increase in their wealth. However, in 1990s managers of “Nortel went on 
frequent buying sprees, often using its own stock to take over tiny companies with 
promising technologies. In 2000 alone, it bought 11 companies for a total of $19.7 billion 
US” (CBC News, September 16, 2009). Such unwise acquisitions led to the downfall of 
Nortel and wiped out shareholders’ wealth.  
 
 A number of prior studies have examined the high-tech acquisitions and 
corresponding market reactions. Kohers and Kohers (2000) examine a U.S. sample of 
1,634 mergers in the various high-tech areas that occurred between January 1987 and 
April 1996. The study results show that acquirers of high-tech targets experience 
significantly positive abnormal returns, regardless of whether the method of payment is 
cash or stock. Further, Kohers and Kohers (2000) find that high-tech targets are paid 
higher premiums than non-high-tech targets. 
 
 Kohers and Kohers (2001) examine a sample of 304 mergers involving both U.S. 
acquirers and foreign acquirers with ADRs, occurring over the period from January 1984 
through December 1995. This study primarily focuses on the long-term stock return 
performance of high-tech acquirers. Their findings show that although acquiring firm 
shareholders react positively to high-tech takeover announcements, these acquirers 
generally underperform industry-matched benchmarks and size- and book-to-market 
matched control portfolios in the long-run. This implies that market shows excess 
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enthusiasm about high-tech acquisitions around the announcement dates and these 
overreactions are corrected in the long-run. However, it should be noted that, Kohers and 
Kohers (2001) do not make corrections for cross-sectional correlations in the holding 
period return (HPR) test statistics. This is likely to induce bias in the test statistics and 
overstate the results (Mitchell and Stafford, 2000).  
 
 Benou and Madura (2005) examine the investment bank’s role in high-tech M&A 
activities. The study results show that high-tech acquisitions using an investment bank of 
any tier are viewed more favorably than similar acquisitions with no investment bank. In 
case of high-tech public targets, however, deals advised by top tier banks perform better 
than those advised by mid- or third-tier banks. These findings are in line with the 
complexity involved in high-tech acquisitions. It appears that investors have more faith in 
a deal once it is endorsed by an investment bank. 
 
2.2 Implication of Payment Method in the M&As by R&D Intensive Firms 
 
Myers and Majluf (1984) contend that if the bidder believes the firm’s shares are properly 
valued, it may offer cash to send a positive signal to the market. As a result, the market is 
likely to view a cash offer as more favorable than a stock offer. Also, if the bidder is 
uncertain about the target’s value, the bidder may not want to offer cash because the 
target will only accept a cash offer greater than its true value and the bidder will have 
overpaid (Fishman, 1989; Fuller et al., 2002). An alternative tax-based hypothesis exists 
that favors stock offers. If a bidder acquires a target with cash, target shareholders must 
pay taxes immediately; while in the case of stock offers, tax implications are deferred 
(Fuller et al., 2002). Empirical studies generally support the hypothesis that shareholders 
of acquiring firms view cash offers more positively than stock offers (Fuller et al., 2002; 
Moeller et al., 2003). In a Canadian context, Eckbo and Thorburn (2000) do not find any 
significant difference for cash payments.  
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In the case of a high-tech acquisitions or acquisitions by R&D intensive firms, 
stock financed deals may have some distinctive advantages. First, it might be more 
prudent to use stock as a method of payment considering the high risk associated with 
and uncertainty involved in high-tech acquisitions. Stock payment is likely to mitigate the 
information asymmetry about the target (Hansen, 1987) and share the risk of a target’s 
overvaluation with the target’s owners (Officer et al., 2009). Second, as Denis and Denis 
(1995) report, target firm’s existing management is often changed in the cash financed 
deals. Such dramatic changes in target firm management may disrupt the post-acquisition 
integration process severely, specially in the high-tech acquisitions. Finally, in the stock 
financed deals existing shareholders of a target firm are more likely to retain a significant 
level of ownership. It is more important to have existing shareholders monitoring the 
activities of the newly acquired firm in high-tech acquisitions due to the complex nature 
of high-tech business. Therefore, in the context of acquisitions by high-tech or R&D 
intensive firms, market may react differently with respect to different payment methods 
and view stock financed deals more favorably. Officer et al. (2009) have empirically 
examined this issue and found that acquirers’ returns are significantly higher in stock-
swap acquisitions of difficult-to-value targets, as measured by R&D intensity and 
idiosyncratic return volatility. However, Kohers and Kohers (2000) do not find any 
significant relationship between method of payment (stock or cash) and acquirers of high-
tech targets.  
 
2.3 Integration of Targets and Impact on Long-term Operating Performance  
 
Conjectures for long-term operating performance of acquiring firms generally evolves 
around ‘synergy motives’. Synergy motive of M&A envisages that there will be an 
improvement in the operating performance of the acquiring or the merged firm in the 
post-acquisition period. Realization of synergistic gains depends on how well a new 
target is integrated with the existing operations of an acquiring firm. Chaudhuri and 
Tarbizi (1999) have identified the post-mergers integration of a target firm as a key factor 
for the successful acquisitions in high-tech sectors. In case of high-tech acquisitions it is 
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quite challenging to integrate the key people of target firms and often acquiring firms do 
not pay adequate attention to this important issue. Goold and Campbell (1998) find that 
synergy initiatives often fall short of management expectations due to poor integration 
efforts. 
 
 A smaller but growing body of literature has investigated the long-term operating 
performance of acquiring firms. However, previous empirical studies in this area have 
reported inconsistent results (Martynova et al., 2006). Most of the recent US based 
studies either report an improvement in operating performance (Heron and Lie, 2002; 
Linn and Switzer, 2001), or an unchanged performance (Moeller and Schlingemann, 
2005) 2. Results from the studies on other markets are also inconsistent. For example, 
using UK data, Powel and Stark (2005) report modest improvements in operating 
performance for acquiring firms. For continental Europe, Gugler et al. (2003) report an 
insignificant increase in post-acquisition profit and Martynova et al. (2006) report an 
insignificant decrease in operating performance. In the similar fashion, Asian studies also 
present inconsistent results (Rahman and Limmack, 2004; Sharma and Ho, 2002). 
Rahman and Limmak (2004) show that operating performance improves significantly for 
Malaysian acquirers; whereas, Sharma and Ho (2002) find insignificant changes in 
acquirers’ post-acquisition operating performance for Australian firms. We are unaware 
of any study that has examined the long-term operating performance of R&D intensive 
acquiring firms. 
 
2.4 Puzzle for Market Participants: Competing Viewpoints 
 
Preceding discussions present various issues and factors that may influence the acquiring 
firm shareholders’ perception about the M&A activities undertaken by R&D intensive 
firms.   
 
2 Moeller & Schlingemann (2005) report no significant change in the long-term operating performance for 
the overall sample. However, they find that cross-border acquisitions have a negative impact on the long-
term operating performance.  
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 In one hand, investors might be quite enthusiastic about the acquisitions by R&D 
intensive firms due to the high-growth potential of the combined firm. In order to sustain 
long-term growth potential and market share, at times it is imperative for the R&D 
intensive firms to make acquisitions. In-house capability development may take time and 
could be more expensive. Therefore, investors might view the acquisitions by R&D 
intensive firms more favorably. We term this view as the ‘growth potential hypothesis’. 
Further, investors of R&D intensive firms are likely to favor ‘stock’ as a method of 
payment that shares the risk of overvaluation of a target firm with the target shareholders.  
 
 On the other hand, due to inherent technological complexity level and uncertainty 
in the high-tech sector, there is a risk of integration failure of target firms in the high-tech 
sector (Chaudhuri and Tabrizi, 1999). In the R&D intensive sector, integration of a target 
firm is more challenging due to the involvement of intangible assets and critical human 
capital. If the target firm is not integrated properly, the long-term operating performance 
of the acquiring firm would suffer - leading to shareholders’ wealth destruction. Due to 
this integration risk, investors might view the acquisitions by R&D intensive firms less 
favorably. We term this view as the ‘integration failure hypothesis’. In this study we 
examine both hypotheses with a Canadian M&A sample.  
 
3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1. Data 
 
This study considers all Canadian M&A deals that occurred between 1993 and 2002 and 
involved a TSX-listed bidding company. We obtain our dataset from the SDC Thomson 
Financial Database. Our data meet the following criteria: (i) the deals were completed, 
(ii) the acquiring firm was not from the financial industry, (iii) acquiring firms with 
multiple acquisitions during 1993-02 period were considered, and (iv) deals with all sizes 
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of transaction value were considered3. Stock return data was collected from the Canadian 
Financial Market Research Center (CFMRC) database. Accounting information was 
collected from the StockGuide database. Using the System for Electronic Document 
Analysis and Retrieval (SEDAR) database, we collect data related to governance 
variables from annual reports and management information circulars.4 The sample set-up 
and the descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1, 2 and 3. 
Insert Table 1, 2 and 3 about Here 
Descriptive statistics of the sample show that: (i) in line with the overall Canadian 
merger and acquisitions (M&A) activities, there is an increase in M&A deals between 
1996 and 2000 but a decline in the post 2000 period but with much larger individual deal 
sizes. (ii) Most of the acquirers (757 out of 968 acquiring firms) are single acquirers (that 
is, made only one completed deal in a calendar year); the rest of the firms made more 
than one acquisition in a given year. (iii) Most of the deals are in minerals, 
manufacturing, and service industries consistent with the industrial landscape in Canada.  
 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of deal-specific factors for a sample with 
no multiple acquisitions. The sample consists of 925 annual observations for acquiring 
firms between 1993 and 2002 that have R&D expenditure data. For acquiring firms, only 
one event is considered in case of multiple acquisitions by the firm in any year. Panel A, 
B and C present descriptive statistics for full sample, firms with R&D expenditures and 
firms with no R&D expenditures, respectively. In terms of the characteristics of the 
offers, we find that (Table 2) there are significantly higher number of (a) merger offers 
than tender offers, (b) pure cash transactions than share swaps, (c) growth acquiring 
firms5 than value acquiring firms, and (d) unrelated acquisitions.  
 
 
3 Out of 1300 events considered in the study, only 88 cases have transaction values less than $1 million 
CDN.  
4 Management proxy circulars are unavailable on the SEDAR database before 1997, which complicated our 
ability to collect information on all governance variables before that date. 
5 We define a growth-acquiring firm as the acquiring firm with price-to-book value of more than 1 in the 
preceding year of an acquisition. 
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Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of firm-specific factors. Panel A, B and 
C present descriptive statistics for full sample, firms with R&D expenditures and firms 
with no R&D expenditures, respectively. Table 3 shows that R&D firms are generally 
larger firms (characterized by market and book value of equity, revenue and total assets), 
have more growth potential (characterized by price to book value ratio), and acquire 
relatively smaller targets.  
 
3.2. Methodology 
  
3.2.1 Abnormal returns around the announcement dates 
 
We follow Brown and Warner’s (1985) standard-event study methodology to calculate 
bidder-announcement effects – abnormal returns (ARs) and cumulative abnormal returns 
(CARs) – around initial acquisition announcements. We use the market model, which 
expresses daily abnormal returns as: 
     )Rβα(RAR mtjjjtjt +−=                        (1)                                 
Where  and  are the observed returns for security “j” and the market portfolio, 
respectively, in time period “t” relative to the event date of interest. We compute the 
security-specific parameters 
jtR mtR
jα  and jβ  over the estimation period t-31 to t–120 trading 
days.6 We exclude the 30-day time interval t-30 to t-1 days to avoid including information 
about the event that may affect security returns. We use multivariate (regression) analysis 
to investigate the effect of R&D intensity on the CARs surrounding an acquisition.  
 
 
 
                                                 
6 Some studies use a longer estimation window (e.g., t-41 to t–240 days). As the estimation window increases, 
the chance of encountering other external events during this estimation period also increases. Since many 
acquirers make multiple acquisitions, we chose to use a shorter estimation window in our analysis. 
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3.2.2 Long-term operating performance 
 
We use a firm’s cash-flow to total assets as a measure of operating performance. We 
present the results for pre- and post-acquisition operating performance using cash flow to 
total assets that is somewhat standard in this literature. To ensure that the results do not 
depend on the methodological choices we use both industry (mean) adjusted (Healy et al., 
1992) and matching firm adjusted (Ghosh, 2001) cash flow to total assets in the pre- and 
post-event period7. The reason for using the latter is two fold: First, Ghosh argues that 
larger firms generally make acquisitions within an industry segment and they are likely to 
be more profitable compared to the industry average benchmark just because of the size 
effect (Fama and French, 1995). Second, acquiring firms generally make acquisitions 
following a period of above industry average performance. Therefore, industry mean 
adjusted operating performance results might be biased. In order to select a matching 
firm, we follow a two-stage procedure. First, we identify all the TSX firms that have not 
made any acquisition in the period of 1992 to 2003. Second, we perform an OLS 
regression considering all acquiring firms and matching firms. We regress the firms’ 
return on equity on firm size and market-to-book value variables and select matching 
firms based on the nearest propensity score obtained by using the coefficients of firm size 
and price-to-book value factors.  
 
 Once we obtain the benchmark cash flows, we compute the industry (mean) 
adjusted and matching firm adjusted cash flows as follows: 
 
 Industry adjusted cash flow return = acquiring firm’s cash flow to total  asset 
      – Industry  mean cash-flow to total asset                       (2a) 
 
 Matching firm adjusted cash flow return = acquiring firm’s cash flow to total asset  
               – matching firms cash-flow to total asset               (2b) 
 
7 Matching firm benchmarks are selected in the spirit of Barber and Lyon’s (1997) arguments. 
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 Subsequently, we first calculate the industry (or matching firm) adjusted 
profitability for each acquiring firm for three years prior and three years subsequent to the 
takeover event. The mean pre-acquisition profitability is compared to the mean 
profitability over the three years subsequent to the merger. We use the t-test to examine 
the difference between pre- and post-acquisition mean performance.  
 
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
 
4.1 Short-term Performance of the Acquiring Firms in the Cross-border Acquisitions 
 
In this section, we use multivariate analysis (OLS regression) to examine the effects of 
R&D intensity (i.e. R&D expenditure divided by sales) on acquiring firms’ Cumulative 
Abnormal Returns (CARs). We employ the following regression model: 
 
CAR =  α + β1 × R&D intensity + β2 × Stock Pay + β3 × R&D intensity × Stock Pay   
 + β4 × Public target + β5 × ln(Market value) + β6 × Price to book value  
 + β7 × R&D intensity × Price to book value + β8 × Related target + β9 × ln(Relative size)   
 + β10 × Tender Offer + β11 × Year dummy + β12 × industry dummy + ε         (3) 
 
Insert Table 4 about Here 
Table 4 presents the results of the regression models. All regression models use CAR (-5, 
+5) as the dependent variable. Regression models include a number of independent and 
control variables. “R&D intensity” is calculated as the R&D expenditure of the acquiring 
firm divided by annual sales. “Market vale” is the total market value of the acquiring 
firm’s equity in the preceding year of M&A event “Stock pay” is a dummy variable. If 
the medium of transaction is pure stock, the value of this dummy variable is ‘1’ and ‘0’ 
otherwise. “Public Target” is a dummy variable. If the target is a public firm, its value is 
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‘1’ and ‘0’ otherwise. “Price to book value” is a ratio of the market price to book value of 
acquiring firm’s share. “Related target” is a dummy variable. For a related acquisition 
(based on 4-digit SIC code), the value is ‘1’ and ‘0’ otherwise. “Relative size” is the ratio 
of transaction value and market value of the acquiring firm’s equity. “Tender Offer” is a 
dummy variable. If a firm completes an acquisition through a tender offer, the value is 1 
and 0 otherwise. Two interaction terms (“R&D intensity × Stock Pay” and “R&D 
intensity × Price to book value”) are included to examine the moderating effect of “Stock 
Pay” and “Price to book value” on the relationship between R&D intensity and CAR. 
Model 1 does not include and interaction effect, Model 2 includes only one interaction 
effect (“R&D intensity × Stock Pay”), whereas Model 3 represents the full model. All 
three models show that coefficient of “R&D intensity” is positive and significant at 5% 
level. This implies that shareholders of R&D intensive firms view M&A activities 
favorably. Probably, they view these M&A activities as the right vehicle to realize the 
growth potential of acquiring firms and maintain the technological capabilities. Among 
other variables, “Relative Size” shows positive and marginal significance (at 10% level). 
The acquisition of a relatively large target is likely to be a more important economic 
event for the acquirer than is the acquisition of a relatively small target (Eckbo et al., 
1990). Higher relative size could bring in more synergy (positive effect). 
 
 Like Kohers and Kohers (2000), results presented in Table 4 shows no 
significance for “Stock Pay”. Similarly, none of the interaction terms are significant in all 
three models. We also examine the moderating effect of “Related target” by including an 
interaction term (“R&D intensity × Related Target”) in the model (results are not 
reported here). Through this interaction term, we examined whether or not R&D 
intensive firms make additional gains by making an acquisitions in the same industry or 
technology sector. However, this interaction term also show insignificant results.  
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4.2 Differentiating Characteristics of R&D Firms 
 
In order to find some plausible explanations for the positive relationship between R&D 
intensity and acquiring firms cumulative abnormal returns, in this section we examine the 
differentiating characteristics of R&D based firms. We employ the following logistic 
regression model to examine the differentiating characteristics of cross-border cash 
financed and stock financed deals.       
Logit (π(R&D Firms)) =  α + β1 × Stock Pay + β2 × Public target  
  + β3 × ln(Market value) + β4 × Price to book value  
  + β5 × Related target + β6 × ln(Relative size) + β7 × Tender Offer  
  + β8 × Year dummy + β9 × industry dummy + ε          (4) 
 
where, π(R&D Firms) is the probability of an acquiring firm to have R&D activities. All 
independent variables are described in the preceding section and in Table 4 and 5. Table 
5 (Model 4, 5 and 6) shows the logistic regression results that examine the differentiating 
characteristics of R&D firm. Model 4 includes the effect of “Stock Pay” but exclude the 
effect of “Price to book ratio”. Model 5 includes the effect of “Price to book ratio” but 
exclude the effect of “Stock Pay”. Model 6 includes both “Stock Pay” and “Price to book 
ratio” variables. 
Insert Table 5 about Here 
 Table 5 presents some interesting results. In all three models, we find that the 
coefficient of “long of Market Value” is positive and highly significant (at 1% level). It 
implies that larger firms have more resources to engage in research activities. Model 4 
and 6 show positive and significant coefficient for “Stock Pay” variables. This implies 
that R&D firms are more likely to use stock payments compared to the non R&D firms. 
Finally, Model 5 and 6 show that “Price to book value” have a significant and positive 
coefficient. This suggests that, in general, R&D firms have higher growth potential.  
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 These findings reinforce the view that, investors might be quite enthusiastic about 
the acquisitions by R&D intensive firms (as reported in Table 4) due to the high-growth 
potential of the combined firm. Further, investors of R&D intensive firms are likely to 
favor ‘stock’ as a method of payment that shares the risk of overvaluation of a target firm 
with the target shareholders. Overall, the results presented in Table 4 and 5 lend support 
for the ‘growth potential hypothesis’. 
 
4.3 Long-term Operating Performance of R&D Intensive Firms 
 
In the preceding section we have found evidence that R&D based acquiring firms’ 
investors are enthusiastic about new acquisitions. Possibly, investors react positively to 
such deals for potential growth prospects. However, due to the complexity involved in 
the high-tech acquisitions and reliance on intangible human capital, there is a high level 
of integration risk involved in such acquisitions. Do R&D intensive firms integrate these 
acquisitions reasonably well? To gain a deeper insight into this issue, we examine the 
long-term operating performance of R&D firms (who have R&D expenditures) and non 
R&D firms (who do not have any R&D expenditures).  
Insert Table 6 about Here 
 Table 6 presents the univariate results for both (i) industry-adjusted and (ii) 
matching firm adjusted operating performance. Panel A presents the results for ‘R&D 
firms’ group. We find significant improvements in “acquiring firms” operating 
performance while considering industry adjusted pre- and post-acquisition operating 
performance (mean difference is 2.1% per year and significance level is 0.008) 8 . 
However, we do not see any significant difference in pre- and post-acquisition 
performance once we consider matching firm adjusted operating performance (mean 
difference is -1.5% per year and the significance level is 0.261)9, albeit there is a negative 
trend. As argued by Ghosh (2001), there are methodological challenges with ‘industry 
 
8 We obtain similar results with median comparison.  
9 We obtain qualitatively similar results by using the ‘intercept approach’ as suggested by Healy et al. 
(1992).  
 17
S.Dutta, V.Kumar / Journal of Risk and Financial Management 2(2009) 1-37 
 
 
adjusted approach’ and hence we rely primarily on ‘matching firm adjusted approach’ 
results. In general, the results presented in Panel A show that acquisitions made by R&D 
firms do not show any significant deterioration in acquirer’s long-term operating 
performance. These results are consistent with short-term stock performance presented in 
Table 4; whereby we found that market reacts favorably to the M&A deals announced by 
R&D intensive firms.  Panel B presents the results for ‘Non R&D firms’ group. Similar 
to the ‘R&D firms’ group, this group also does not show any significant changes in 
operating performance in the long-run, once we consider the results from matching firm 
approach. 
 
 These results do not support the ‘integration failure hypothesis’. It appears that 
although R&D intensive acquirers somewhat struggle to integrate a new target firm after 
acquisitions (as evident in a negative trend in long-term performance shown in Panel A - 
matching firm approach), their long-term operating performance do not suffer 
significantly. 
 
5. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS  
 
5.1 Examining the Role of Governance Factors 
 
In the recent past, there has been an increased level of attention to corporate governance 
issues and how a firm’s governance structure influences its decision making process. 
Two of the most important corporate governance mechanisms – that are extensively 
examined in the extant literature - are the ownership structure and the board structure. In 
this study, we subsequently examine the impact of CEO ownership structure and board 
structure on the market reactions to M&A announcements.  
 
 Earlier studies such as Berle and Means (1932) and Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
point out that the level of managerial ownership is a potential source of agency problem. 
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If the managerial ownership is too low, their interest will not be aligned with that of other 
shareholders. As a result, management may make decisions that are not in the best 
interests of shareholders. On the other hand, if management has considerable ownership 
in a firm, they may be more careful in making a decision that is more favorable for the 
existing shareholders as the increased level of managerial ownership would align 
management’s interest with that of shareholders’ (Fama and Jensen, 1983; 
Subrahmanyam et al., 1997). This would lead to better managerial decisions. However, 
some studies have argued and showed that such relationship might not be monotonic 
(Morck et al., 1988). Kohers and Kohers (2000) examine the impact of insider ownership 
on acquirer’s abnormal return and find that the acquirer’s insider ownership has a 
positive effect on acquirer up to a certain point. 
 
 A common perception is that the board of directors plays an active role in 
formulating corporate strategy (Westphal and Fredrickson, 2001) which could often be 
quite complex and challenging (McDonald et al., 2008). Previous studies examine the 
role of board independence (i.e., presence of insider/ outsider directors) on a firm’s 
strategic decision making processes. However, the extant literature provides competing 
theories and evidence. For example, Baysinger and Hoskisson (1990) hypothesize that 
insider board members’ representation would facilitate a board’s involvement in their 
firm’s strategic change process as insiders have relatively greater access to corporate 
information and are in a better position to evaluate CEO actions. Furthermore, outside 
directors may evaluate CEO performance solely on the basis of short-term financial 
performance that would prompt CEOs to act conservatively. Several recent studies share 
similar views (e.g. Kumar and Sivaramakrishnan, 2009; Harris and Raviv, 2009). On the 
other hand, as Johnson et al. (1993) point out, outside directors’ goals may be more 
aligned with shareholder interests and may seek strategic change when they encounter 
poor firm performance. 
Insert Table 7 about Here 
 Table 7 (Model 7, 8 and 9) shows the OLS robust regression results that test the 
impact of governance variables on the acquisition announcement returns. We use the 
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CARs of the acquiring firms in the window of (-5, +5) days around the acquisition 
announcement as the dependent variable. “CEO ownership” indicates the total stock 
ownership held by the CEO of the acquiring firm. “Ratio of Ind. Directors” indicates the 
independence of acquiring firm’s board structure. It is calculated as the ratio of 
independent or unrelated board members and total number of directors on the board. 
However, none of these governance variables show any significant results. In all three 
models (Model 7, 8 and 9), the coefficient of R&D intensity variable still remain positive 
and significant. This shows robustness of the results presented in Table 4.  
 
5.2 Examining the Long-term Stock Return Performance 
 
Kohers and Kohers (2001) find that although acquiring firms in high-tech sectors react 
favorably to the M&A deals around the announcement dates, the same acquirers show 
significant long-term stock return underperformance. Kohers and Kohers (2001) attribute 
such observations to the initial excess enthusiasm by the acquiring firms’ investors that 
lead to errors in judgment.  Given the high-growth potential of high-tech firms, initially 
market participants might overestimate the gain from these M&As, which are corrected 
over time leading to a long-term stock return underperformance. 
 
 Although, this explanation has some merit, there are fundamental challenges in 
drawing firm conclusions on the misevaluation of M&A deals based on long-term stock 
return performance results. Earlier studies that report long-term abnormal stock returns 
assume that the market gradually reassesses the quality of acquiring firms as the results of 
the acquisition become more clear (Rau and Vermaelen, 1998). However, according to 
the market efficiency hypothesis, the market should correct any over-reaction or under-
reaction within a short period of time. Fama (1998) investigated a set of past studies that 
examined the long-term abnormal performance following a corporate event (such as IPO, 
mergers, stock-split). He dismissed any systematic claim of long-term abnormal returns 
and concluded that “consistent with the market efficiency hypothesis that the anomalies 
are chance results, apparent overreaction of stock prices to information is about as 
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common as under-reaction. And post-event continuation of pre-event abnormal returns is 
about as frequent as post-event reversal” (p. 304). In a very comprehensive study, that 
uses a set of benchmarks and different methodologies (e.g. calendar time and event time 
approach), Mitchell and Stafford (2000) report inconclusive evidence or no abnormal 
long-term returns for U.S. acquirers. In a more recent study, Dutta and Jog (2009) report 
no systematic long-term abnormal returns for the Canadian acquiring firms. Further, 
investigation of long-term abnormal stock returns primarily shed light on the perception 
of market participants and extent of misevaluation. However, notwithstanding such 
arguments and findings, evidence of long-term underperformance as presented in some of 
the detail and careful studies (such as Rau and Vermaelen, 1998) remains a puzzle and 
keep the issue controversial.  
 
 In this section we examine the long-term stock return performance of Canadian 
acquiring firms for two groups, namely, R&D firms and non R&D firms. The relevant 
methodology and the results are presented below. 
 
Methodology: We followed standard buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) 
methodology10 (Barber and Lyon, 1997) in order to examine the long term performance 
of acquiring firms. We define the buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) as the return on 
a buy-and-hold investment in the sample firm less the return on a buy-and-hold 
investment in an asset/portfolio with an appropriate expected return: 
∏∏
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+−+=
ττ
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t
it
t
iti RERBHAR       (5) 
Expected return, E(Rit ), in Equation 3, is calculated in two ways: by using (i) a reference 
portfolio return (such as market index return), and (ii) control firm return (such as a 
matching firm based on size and book to market value ratio). As reported by Barber and 
Lyon (1997), BHAR with reference portfolio is subject to a new listing bias, a skewness 
bias, and a rebalancing bias. We used Lyon et al.’s (1999) methodology to account for 
 
10 We use monthly return data for three years (i.e. 36 monthly return data) starting from the closing date of 
the deal in the BHAR analysis. 
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skewness bias while we calculated BHAR with reference portfolio. The control firm 
approach eliminates the new listing bias (since both the sample and control firm must be 
listed in the identified event month), the rebalancing bias (since both the sample and 
control firm returns are calculated without rebalancing), and the skewness problem (since 
the sample and the control firms are equally likely to experience large positive returns). 
In the control firm approach, we used the same matching firms as identified in the BHAR 
analysis. However, neither the reference portfolio approach nor the control firm approach 
accounts for cross-dependence among acquisition events which poses a serious problem 
to event-time based long-term performance methodologies such as BHAR. Consequently, 
we have adopted the correction procedure employed by Mitchell and Stafford (2000) for 
the adjustment of cross-sectional dependence in BHAR test statistics: 
jiBHAR
BHAR
Ndependence
ceindependen
,)1(1
1
)(
)(
ρσ
σ
−+
≈       (6) 
Where, N = number of sample events, )(BHARσ  is the cross-sectional sample standard 
deviations of abnormal returns for the sample of ‘N’ firms and ji,ρ  = average correlation 
of individual BHARs. In this study, we report our results based on control firm approach. 
Insert Table 8 about Here 
Results: Table 8 presents the BHAR analysis for R&D firms and non R&D firms. Results 
for both value weighted BHAR and equal weighted BHAR are presented in Panel A and 
Panel B, respectively.  Results from Panel A and Panel B show that both R&D firms and 
non R&D firms do not exhibit and significant long-term stock return underperformance. 
Our results differ significantly from Kohers and Kohers (2001) who report long-term 
underperformance for high-tech acquirers with a U.S. sample. Although most of the 
earlier studies with a U.S. sample show negative or insignificant results for acquiring 
firms around the announcement dates, Kohers and Kohers (2000 and 2001) report that for 
high-tech acquirers the market reactions are significantly positive. Kohers and Kohers 
view such results as an excess enthusiasm by investors around the high-tech M&A 
announcements. They posit that market overestimates the growth potential of high-tech 
M&As at the initial stage and gradually make downward corrections in the long-run. This 
leads to the long-term underperformance of the high-tech acquiring firms. Although, 
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these results are interesting, it should be noted that there are methodological challenges 
that are not adequately addressed in Kohers and Kohers’ (2001) long-term performance 
analysis. Kohers and Kohers’ (2001) do not make adjustments for cross-sectional 
independence in BHAR test statistics. In an influential study, Mitchell and Stafford 
(2000) argue that we need to make corrections for cross-sectional dependence in BHAR 
analysis in order to mitigate biases in BHAR test results. 
 
 In the Canadian context, the results presented in Table 8 are not surprising. The 
results of insignificant changes in long-term stock return performance (as reported in 
Table 8) are also in line with Fama’s (1998) argument. While most of U.S. studies report 
negative or insignificant results for acquiring firms, previous Canadian studies 
consistently report significantly positive abnormal returns around the announcement date 
(Eckbo and Thorburn, 2000; Yuce and Ng, 2005). Therefore, positive reactions by the 
investors of Canadian R&D intensive firms around the M&A announcement dates are not 
surprising. Further, our long-term operating performance analysis shows that R&D firms 
do not show any significant failure in integrating a target. In summary, we do not find 
any evidence of over enthusiasm by shareholders of Canadian R&D intensive firms 
around the M&A announcement dates. These observations show support to Doukas and 
Petmezas (2007) view that outcome of M&A studies could be dependent on a particular 
market data.   
 
6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
Due to the competitive pressure and time-lag in developing in-house innovative 
capabilities, R&D intensive firms often resort to mergers and acquisitions activities to 
realize growth potential. However, M&A activities pose significant challenges for the 
R&D intensive firms. High-tech acquisitions are complex in nature and require 
significant efforts in integrating the new targets and its intangible but critical human 
capitals. Accordingly, it is also difficult for the investors to evaluate the prospects of an 
acquisition undertaken by R&D intensive firms.  
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 In this study, we focus on 925 completed deals by Canadian acquirers between 
1993 and 2002 that have information on R&D expenditures, thus provide an out-of-
sample study. Our results show that R&D intensity (i.e. R&D expenditure by sales) has a 
positive and significant effect on cumulative abnormal returns of the acquiring firms 
around the announcement dates. This implies that market generally favors the M&A 
deals by R&D intensive firms. An analysis of the differentiating characteristics between 
R&D and non R&D firms reveals that R&D firms have a significantly higher growth 
potential and undertake more stock financed deals compared to the non R&D firms. It 
appears that investors of R&D intensive firms view these acquisitions as a mean to 
realize higher growth potential and react positively to these M&A announcements. 
 
 In order to understand the integration challenges posed by a new target to an R&D 
intensive firm, we further analyze the long-term operating performance of R&D firms. 
Our results show that although there are some signs of struggle by the R&D firms in 
integrating a new target firm after acquisitions (characterized by a negative trend in long-
term performance), it does not make any significant impact on long-term operating 
performance. Finally, in the spirit of Kohers and Kohers (2001), we also examine the 
long-term stock return performance of R&D firms. Unlike Kohers and Kohers (2001), 
our results do not show any significant long-term underperformance. This finding 
supports the view of Fama (1998), who terms long-term abnormal stock return results as 
‘chance results’.  
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TABLES 
 
Table 1. Yearly and Sectoral Distribution of Canadian Acquirers Listed on Toronto Stock 
Exchange 
The sample size is 1300 acquisition events over 1993-2002 period by Canadian acquirers listed on the TSX. 
The sample includes multiple acquirers. ‘Multiple acquirers’ refers to the acquiring firms that acquire more 
than one target in a calendar year. ‘Single acquirers’ acquire only one target in any calendar year. 
 
Panel A. Number of acquisitions over 1993-2002 and corresponding transaction value 
 
 
# of 
Transactions 
# of 
Acquirer 
# of 
Single 
Acquirer 
# of 
Multiple 
Acquirer 
Total 
Transaction 
Value (in $ 
mil. CDN) 
Avg. 
Transaction 
Value (in $ 
mil. CDN) 
1993 93 70 57 13 4919.0 52.9 
1994 105 82 67 15 9021.2 85.9 
1995 107 78 63 15 7757.6 72.5 
1996 139 100 73 27 7366.3 53.0 
1997 159 127 101 26 11293.7 71.0 
1998 160 109 81 28 40006.9 250.0 
1999 135 105 84 21 30467.8 225.7 
2000 150 107 85 22 54739.8 364.9 
2001 134 100 75 25 18440.2 137.6 
2002 118 90 71 19 18922.5 160.4 
       
Total 1300 968 757 211 202934.9 156.1 
 
 
Panel B. Transactions by Primary SIC Code 
 
SIC 
# of 
Transacti
ons 
# of 
Acquirer 
# of single 
Acquirer 
# of 
Multiple 
Acquirer 
Total 
Transaction 
Value (in $ 
mil CDN) 
Avg. 
Transaction 
Value (in $ 
mil. CDN) 
       
10 Minerals 394 303 242 61 31723.3 80.5 
20-39 Manufacturing 325 239 184 55 89352.3 274.9 
40 Communications 154 101 71 30 53195.2 345.4 
50 Trade 42 35 30 5 1730.2 41.2 
70-89 Services 385 290 230 60 26933.9 70.0 
       
Total 1300 968 757 211 202934.9 156.1 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of Deal-Specific Variables for Acquiring Firms 
The sample consists of 925 annual observations for acquiring firms between 1993 and 2002. For acquiring firms, only one event is considered in case of multiple 
acquisitions by the firm in any year.  “Deal size” is the total transaction value in million Canadian dollars. “Tender or merger” is a dummy variable. If the 
acquisition is completed through tender offer, the value is “1” and “0” otherwise. “Target type” is a categorical variable outlining the nature of target firm. Three 
categories are created: (i) public target, (ii) private target, and (iii) other (subsidiaries, joint ventures etc.). “Related/unrelated acquisition” is a dummy variable. 
For related acquisition, the value is “1” and “0” otherwise. It is determined based on the SIC code of acquiring firm and target firm. Two versions of this dummy 
variable are created based on: (i) 4-digit SIC code, and (ii) 2-digit SIC code (not reported here). “Methods of payment” is a categorical variable outlining the 
nature of transaction payment mode. Three categories are created: (i) pure cash payment, (ii) pure stock payment, and (iii) mixed or other. “Growth or value” is a 
dummy variable. The value is “1” if the acquiring firm’s price to book value ratio is greater than 1 and “0” otherwise.  
 
Full Sample R&D Firms Non R&D Firms 
     Number Percentage Number Percentage Number Percentage
Deal Size Less than 10m 391 42% 122 42% 269 42% 
(Transaction Value) 10 to 100m 369 40% 118 41% 251 39% 
 More than 100m 
 
165 18% 48 17% 117 18% 
       
        Tender or Merger Tender 107 12% 25 9% 82 13%
 Merger
 
       
       
        
818 88% 263 91% 555 87%
Target Type Public 272 29% 81 28% 191 30%
 Private       
       
348 38% 104 36% 244 38%
 Other (Sub., JV) 
 
305 33% 103 36% 202 32% 
Related/ Unrelated Target  Related 382 41% 106 37% 276 43% 
(based on 4 digit SIC) Unrelated 543 59% 182 63% 361 57% 
              
Methods of Payment        Cash 539 58% 156 54% 383 60%
 Stock       
        
       
110 12% 44 15% 66 10%
Other/Mixed
 
276 30% 88 31% 188 30%
Growth or Value Acquirers Growth 760 82% 245 85% 515 81% 
 Value       
        
128 14% 31 11% 97 15%
Info. not available 37 4% 12 4% 25 4%
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics of Firm-Specific Variables for Acquiring Firms 
The sample consists of 925 annual observations for acquiring firms between 1993 and 2002. For acquiring 
firms, only one event is considered in case of multiple acquisitions by the firm in any year. “Market vale of 
equity” is the total market value of the acquiring firm’s equity in the preceding year of M&A event 
“Market value of equity” is calculated as the year end share price multiplied by number of outstanding 
shares. “Revenue” is the annual sales revenue of the acquiring firm. “Total assets” and “Total equity” are 
obtained from acquiring firm’s balance sheet. “Cash flow to total asset” is the ratio of operating cash flow 
to total asset of acquiring firm. “Price to book value” is the ratio of market price of share to the book value 
per share. “Relative size” is the ratio of transaction value and market value of the acquiring firm’s equity.  
 
Panel A. Full sample (N = 925) 
 Market 
value of 
equity  
(in ‘000$) 
Revenue 
(in ‘000$) 
Total Assets 
(in ‘000$) 
Total equity 
(Book 
Value) 
(in ‘000$) 
Cash flow 
to Total 
Asset 
 
Price to 
Book 
Value 
 
Relative 
Size 
 
Mean    
894,290.25  
  
837,513.72 
  
1,201,830.94 
  
675,447.44 
   
0.08  
   
2.45 
  
0.36 
Median    
199,200.00  
  
119,167.00 
  
181,151.00 
  
97,372.00 
   
0.09  
   
1.91 
  
0.08 
Std. 
Dev. 
   
1,783,521.79  
  
2,146,612.40 
  
2,766,677.76 
  
2,225,312.33 
   
0.11  
   
1.99 
  
1.85 
 
Panel B. Only R&D Firms (N = 288) 
 Market 
value of 
equity  
(in ‘000$) 
Revenue 
(in ‘000$) 
Total Assets 
(in ‘000$) 
Total equity 
(Book 
Value) 
(in ‘000$) 
Cash flow 
to Total 
Asset 
 
Price to 
Book 
Value 
 
Relative 
Size 
 
Mean    
1,145,198.87  
  
933,925.49 
  
1,308,330.38 
  
1,048,623.98 
   
0.06  
   
3.03 
  
0.17 
Median    
301,928.10  
  
108,890.00 
  
184,342.00 
  
124,604.00 
   
0.09  
   
2.40 
  
0.06 
Std. 
Dev. 
   
2,064,822.35  
  
2,599,743.14 
  
3,116,383.71 
  
3,433,573.69 
   
0.14  
   
2.43 
  
0.27 
 
Panel C. Only Non R&D Firms (N = 637) 
 Market 
value of 
equity  
(in ‘000$) 
Revenue 
(in ‘000$) 
Total Assets 
(in ‘000$) 
Total equity 
(Book 
Value) 
(in ‘000$) 
Cash flow 
to Total 
Asset 
 
Price to 
Book 
Value 
 
Relative 
Size 
 
Mean    
784,005.25  
  
794,511.01 
  
1,154,271.38 
  
506,727.12 
   
0.09  
   
2.19 
  
0.45 
Median    
171,280.13  
  
127,015.00 
  
181,151.00 
  
89,880.00 
   
0.09  
   
1.75 
  
0.09 
Std. 
Dev. 
   
1,634,449.98  
  
1,910,986.87 
  
2,596,625.61 
  
1,335,212.29 
   
0.09  
   
1.71 
  
2.22 
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Table 4. Effects of R&D Intensity on Acquirer’s Return 
Table 4 shows the OLS robust regression results that test the impact of R&D intensity on the acquisition 
announcement returns. We use the CARs of the acquiring firms in the window of (-5, +5) days around the 
acquisition announcement as the dependent variable. For acquiring firms, only one event is considered in 
case of multiple acquisitions by the firm in any year. “R&D intensity” is calculated as the R&D 
expenditure of the acquiring firm divided by annual sales. “Market vale” is the total market value of the 
acquiring firm’s equity in the preceding year of M&A event “Stock pay” is a dummy variable. If the 
medium of transaction is pure stock, the value of this dummy variable is ‘1’ and ‘0’ otherwise. “Public 
Target” is a dummy variable. If the target is a public firm, its value is ‘1’ and ‘0’ otherwise. “Price to book 
value” is a ratio of the market price to book value of acquiring firm’s share. “Related target” is a dummy 
variable. For a related acquisition (based on 4-digit SIC code), the value is ‘1’ and ‘0’ otherwise. “Relative 
size” is the ratio of transaction value and market value of the acquiring firm’s equity. “Tender Offer” is a 
dummy variable. If a firm completes an acquisition through a tender offer, the value is 1 and 0 otherwise. *, 
**, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. P-values are presented 
in italics.  
 
Dependent Variable: CAR (-5, +5) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
    
R&D Intensity 0.0473** 0.0643** 0.0535** 
 0.0230 0.0210 0.0330 
Ln (Market Value) 0.0011 0.0012 0.0011 
 0.7170 0.7030 0.7270 
Stock Pay -0.0135 -0.0099 -0.0097 
 0.3330 0.4910 0.5040 
Public Target -0.0031 -0.0029 -0.0029 
 0.5690 0.5900 0.5870 
Related Target -0.0112 -0.0105 -0.0104 
 0.2150 0.2430 0.2470 
Tender Offer -0.0202 -0.0199 -0.0199 
 0.1500 0.1570 0.1580 
Price to Book Value 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0002 
 0.9770 0.9760 0.9410 
Ln (Relative Size) 0.0045* 0.0045* 0.0045* 
 0.0900 0.0900 0.0910 
R&D Intensity × Stock Pay  -0.0415 -0.0497 
  0.2170 0.2660 
R&D Intensity × Price to Book Ratio   0.0042 
   0.7000 
Constant 0.0190 0.0178 0.0195 
 0.6670 0.6870 0.6590 
    
Year effect Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes 
    
N 627 627 627 
R-square 0.035 0.0365 0.0367 
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Table 5. Differentiating Characteristics of R&D Firms 
Table 5 shows the logistic regression results that examine the differentiating characteristics of R&D firm. 
π(R&D firm) is the dependent variable that denotes the probability of being an R&D firm. “R&D firm” is a 
dummy variable. If an acquiring firm has R&D expenditure, its value is ‘1’ and ‘0’ otherwise. “Market 
vale” is the total market value of the acquiring firm’s equity in the preceding year of M&A event “Stock 
pay” is a dummy variable. If the medium of transaction is pure stock, the value of this dummy variable is 
‘1’ and ‘0’ otherwise. “Public Target” is a dummy variable. If the target is a public firm, its value is ‘1’ and 
‘0’ otherwise. “Price to book value” is a ratio of the market price to book value of acquiring firm’s share. 
“Related target” is a dummy variable. For a related acquisition (based on 4-digit SIC code), the value is ‘1’ 
and ‘0’ otherwise. “Relative size” is the ratio of transaction value and market value of the acquiring firm’s 
equity. “Tender Offer” is a dummy variable. If a firm completes an acquisition through a tender offer, the 
value is 1 and 0 otherwise. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels 
respectively. P-values are presented in italics.  
 
Dependent Variable: π(R&D firm) Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
    
Ln (Market Value) 0.241*** 0.237*** 0.248*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Public Target 0.0802 0.0277 0.0771 
 0.486 0.812 0.517 
Related Target -0.314* -0.338* -0.341* 
 0.068 0.057 0.056 
Tender Offer -0.438 -0.401 -0.369 
 0.156 0.199 0.239 
Stock Pay 0.605***  0.556** 
 0.01  0.024 
Ln (Relative Size) -0.0747 -0.0602 -0.0662 
 0.133 0.241 0.198 
Price to Book Value  0.141*** 0.139*** 
  0.001 0.001 
Constant -3.19*** -3.4*** -3.72*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    
Year effect Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes 
    
N 881 857 857 
Pseudo R-Square 0.125 0.138 0.143 
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Table 6. Operating Performance (Cash Flow to Total Assets) for Pre- and Post-
Merger Period 
“Industry adjusted cash flow to total asset” is the average difference in the operating performance (cash 
flow to total asset) between the acquiring firm and industry average for a given year relative to the 
acquisition year. “Industry adjusted post average cash flow to total asset” is the average of “Industry 
adjusted cash flow to total asset” for post acquisition period (year +1, +2 and +3). “Industry adjusted pre 
average cash flow to total asset” is the average of “Industry adjusted cash flow to total asset” for pre 
acquisition period (year -1, -2 and -3).” Industry adjusted post and pre difference” is the average of the 
difference between “Industry adjusted post average cash flow to total asset” and “Industry adjusted pre 
average cash flow to total asset”. “Matching firm adjusted cash flow to total asset” is the average difference 
in the operating performance (cash flow to total asset) between the acquiring firm and matching firm for a 
given year relative to the acquisition year. The “Individual marching firm” was selected based on the 
nearest propensity score with respect to firm size and price to book value. “Matching adjusted post average 
cash flow to total asset” is the average of “matching firm adjusted cash flow to total asset” for post 
acquisition period (year +1, +2 and +3). “Matching adjusted pre average cash flow to total asset” is the 
average of “Matching firm adjusted cash flow to total asset” for the pre-acquisition period (year -1, -2 and -
3). “Matching firm adjusted post and pre difference” is the average of the difference between “Matching 
adjusted post average cash flow to total asset” and “Matching adjusted pre average cash flow to total asset”. 
t-statistics and significance level are reported for each mean difference. In case of multiple acquisitions by 
a firm in any year, only one event was considered in the analysis. All operating performance variables are 
expressed in decimals. Mean differences in operating performance are expressed in decimals (not in 
percentage). “R&D firm” is a dummy variable. If an acquiring firm has R&D expenditure, its value is ‘1’ 
and ‘0’ otherwise. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
Panel A. Operating performance of acquiring firms with R&D Expenditures (i.e. R&D firms) 
Year Relative to 
M&A 
Industry adjusted cash flow  
to total asset 
(Acquiring firm – Industry Avg.) 
 Matching firm adjusted cash flow to 
total asset 
(Acquiring firm – Matching firm) 
 Mean t-stat p-value  Mean t-stat p-value 
3 0.084*** 7.185 0.000  -0.003 -0.192 0.848 
2 0.094*** 9.857 0.000  0.047*** 2.626 0.009 
1 0.100*** 10.214 0.000  0.054*** 3.059 0.003 
-1 0.080*** 8.127 0.000  0.057*** 4.095 0.000 
-2 0.064*** 6.107 0.000  0.039** 2.101 0.037 
-3 0.074*** 6.583 0.000  0.067*** 3.785 0.000 
        
Post Average: 
mean of years 3, 
2, and 1 0.095*** 11.922 0.000 
 
0.039*** 2.628 0.009 
Pre Average: 
mean of years –3, 
-2, and -1 0.073*** 8.805 0.000 
 
0.054*** 4.185 0.000 
(Post - Pre) 
Difference 
 0.021*** 2.688 0.008 
 
-0.015 -1.128 0.261 
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Panel B. Operating performance of acquiring firms with no R&D Expenditures (i.e. non R&D firms) 
Year Relative to 
M&A 
Industry adjusted cash flow  
to total asset 
(Acquiring firm – Industry Avg.) 
 Matching firm adjusted cash flow to 
total asset 
(Acquiring firm – Matching firm) 
 Mean t-stat p-value  Mean t-stat p-value 
3 0.029*** 3.754 0.000  0.047*** 3.723 0.000 
2 0.025*** 5.390 0.000  0.049*** 5.236 0.000 
1 0.021*** 4.336 0.000  0.051*** 4.622 0.000 
-1 0.023*** 5.387 0.000  0.052*** 6.963 0.000 
-2 0.016*** 3.520 0.000  0.053*** 6.636 0.000 
-3 0.014*** 3.052 0.002  0.050*** 5.171 0.000 
        
Post Average: 
mean of years 3, 
2, and 1 0.025*** 5.545 0.000 
 
0.049*** 5.424 0.000 
Pre Average: 
mean of years –3, 
-2, and -1 0.016*** 4.462 0.000 
 
0.050*** 7.053 0.000 
(Post - Pre) 
Difference 
 0.009** 2.127 0.034 
 
-0.001 -0.132 0.895 
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Table 7. Effects of Governance Variables on Acquirer’s Return (1997 – 2002) 
Table 7 shows the OLS robust regression results that test the impact of governance variables on the 
acquisition announcement returns. We use the CARs of the acquiring firms in the window of (-5, +5) days 
around the acquisition announcement as the dependent variable. For acquiring firms, only one event is 
considered in case of multiple acquisitions by the firm in any year. “R&D intensity” is calculated as the 
R&D expenditure of the acquiring firm divided by annual sales. “Market vale” is the total market value of 
the acquiring firm’s equity in the preceding year of M&A event “Stock pay” is a dummy variable. If the 
medium of transaction is pure stock, the value of this dummy variable is ‘1’ and ‘0’ otherwise. “Public 
Target” is a dummy variable. If the target is a public firm, its value is ‘1’ and ‘0’ otherwise. “Price to book 
value” is a ratio of the market price to book value of acquiring firm’s share. “Related target” is a dummy 
variable. For a related acquisition (based on 4-digit SIC code), the value is ‘1’ and ‘0’ otherwise. “Relative 
size” is the ratio of transaction value and market value of the acquiring firm’s equity. “Tender Offer” is a 
dummy variable. If a firm completes an acquisition through a tender offer, the value is 1 and 0 otherwise. 
“CEO ownership” is the total stock ownership by a CEO in the acquiring firm. “Ratio of Ind. Director” is 
calculated as the ratio of independent board members and total board size (i.e. total number of directors). *, 
**, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. P-values are presented 
in italics.  
 
Dependent Variable: CAR (-5, +5) Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
    
R&D Intensity 0.0395** 0.0539** 0.0562** 
 0.0330 0.0240 0.0450 
Ln (Market Value) 0.0034 0.0037 0.0037 
 0.4550 0.4220 0.4200 
Stock Pay -0.0148 -0.0109 -0.0110 
 0.4280 0.5800 0.5770 
Public Target -0.0038 -0.0037 -0.0037 
 0.6220 0.6390 0.6390 
Related Target -0.0075 -0.0068 -0.0068 
 0.5370 0.5740 0.5740 
Tender Offer -0.0342 -0.0343 -0.0342 
 0.0760 0.0760 0.0760 
Price to Book Value -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0007 
 0.8220 0.8170 0.8550 
Ln (Relative Size) 0.0036 0.0036 0.0036 
 0.3040 0.3000 0.3020 
CEO Ownership 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 
 0.3720 0.3630 0.3660 
Ratio of Ind. Directors 0.0237 0.0262 0.0262 
 0.4960 0.4570 0.4580 
R&D Intensity × Stock Pay  -0.0315 -0.0288 
  0.3220 0.4640 
R&D Intensity × Price to Book Ratio   -0.0011 
   0.9120 
Constant -0.0133 -0.0184 -0.0187 
 0.8190 0.7540 0.7500 
    
Year effect Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes 
N 384 384 384 
R-square 0.0423 0.0435 0.0435 
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Table 8. Buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) for acquiring firms (with 36 
monthly returns following the deal completion) 
“BHAR” is the buy and hold abnormal return based on the average difference in the aggregated 
(compounded) performance between the included stock and the benchmark over a 36-month period starting 
after the effective month of acquisition. Value weight BHAR is calculated based on the market value 
weight of the acquiring firm at the effective date of acquisition. Equal weight BHAR is calculated based on 
the equal weight of the acquiring firm at the effective date of acquisition (i.e. equal weight is assigned to 
each case irrespective of its market value). BHAR uses individual matching firm returns as the benchmark. 
Adjusted t-statistics accounts for skewness and cross-sectional dependence in stock returns. BHAR values 
are expressed in decimals (not in percentage). “R&D firm” is a dummy variable. If an acquiring firm has 
R&D expenditure, its value is ‘1’ and ‘0’ otherwise. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
 
Panel A. R&D and Non R&D firms (Value Weight results) 
 M&A deals by R&D firms  
(N = 244) 
M&A deals by non R&D firms 
(N = 475) 
Value weighted BHAR 
(individual matching firm as a 
benchmark) 
0.014181 
 
0.222591 
 
Adj. t-stat 0.107694 1.115692 
 
Panel B. R&D and Non R&D firms (Equal Weight results) 
 M&A deals by R&D firms  
(N = 244) 
M&A deals by non R&D firms 
(N = 475) 
Equal weighted BHAR 
(individual matching firm as a 
benchmark) 
-0.17409 
 
-0.30167 
 
Adj. t-stat -0.59554 -0.97224 
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